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Abstract 
In this paper I identify a tension between the two sets of works by Kuhn regarding the genesis 
of the “new historiography” of science.  In the first, it could be said that the change from the 
traditional to the new historiography is strictly endogenous (referring to internal causes or 
reasons).  In the second, the change is predominantly exogenous.  To address this question, I 
draw on a text that is considered to be less important among Kuhn’s works, but which, as 
shall be argued, allows some contact between Kuhn’s two approaches via Koyré. I seek to 
point out and differentiate the roles of Koyré and Kuhn – from Kuhn’s point of view – in the 
development of the historiography of science and, as a complement, present some reflections 
regarding the justification of the new historiography.   
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1. Introduction 
It has been said that Thomas Kuhn`s first sentence in The structure of scientific 
revolutions is “perhaps the most famous sentence in the philosophy of science of the second 
half of the twentieth century” (Richardson 2003, p. vii).1  The sentence, it is worth noting, 
does not refer to the theory of paradigms, the main element in Structure that had such 
widespread repercussions, but rather to history; and it is a methodological observation, in two 
senses:  it refers to the method of the history of science (proposes a change in methods, a new 
historiography of science) and, at the same time, to the method of the philosophy of science 
(proposes a role for the new historiography of science in the philosophy of science).   
                                                 
1
 The sentence is the following: “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could 
produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed” (Kuhn 1970a, p. 1). 
 
 2 
Kuhn said that Structure depends on the new historiography of science, and I believe I 
can justify my investigation into the theme also by the importance it attributes to the history 
of the historiography of science (Kuhn, 1977, p. xv).  Kuhn demonstrates this through his 
frequent autobiographical references to the episode that led him from science to its history, as 
well as writings devoted directly to the genesis of the new historiography of science.2 
Speaking of genesis, the idea of the present essay emerged from a comparison of these 
writings by Kuhn regarding the NHS in which two well-demarcated sets can be observed.  
The first includes Sections I and VI of The structure of scientific revolutions, and an article 
published the same year (1962), “The historical structure of scientific discovery”.  On the 
other side is the article “History of science”, originally published in 1968 and included in the 
1977 collection of articles The Essential Tension.  What called my attention, and suggested 
this demarcation, was that the two sets of writings offer entirely different explanations for the 
genesis (and justification) of the NHS.  In the first set, we could say that the change in the 
historiography of science is understood as strictly endogenous (related to internal causes or 
reasons).  In the article from 1968, the prevalent approach is clearly exogenous.3 
One way to deal with this difficulty would be to assume that the more recent text offers 
the “up-dated” explanation, and that Kuhn abandons the earlier one.  The fact is that he does 
not even refer to the earlier version, nor does he explicitly discard it, which leaves a margin of 
doubt. In addition, he republishes the article from 1962, as well as the one from 1968, in his 
1977 selection of writings.   
Another way to understand this question would be to juxtapose the two explanations, 
which are not actually incompatible.  This is the approach of Hoyningen-Huene, who sees no 
tension between the texts, and only comments in a note that while Structure “lists only 
troubles internal to the historiography of science”, the text in Essential tension  “treats the 
broader complex of factors involved in a more balanced manner” (Hoyningen-Huene 2003, p. 
16). 
However, as we saw, the fact that Kuhn does not even refer to the endogenous 
explanation in the more recent text makes it difficult to accept this approach.  Kuhn appears to 
be simply abandoning the first explanation.  And even though he reproduces the 1962 text in 
Essential tension, as though he were endorsing it in 1977, in his preface to the book, Kuhn 
refers only to the 1968 text when discussing the genesis of the NHS (classifying it among the 
                                                 
2
 Abbreviated from here on as NHS. 
3
 Published as an entry in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (where Kuhn refers to himself in the 
third person), the 1968 article is the most specific and comprehensive text by Kuhn on the history of science.  
 3 
“historiographic studies” that compose the first half of the book).  The 1962 text, on the other 
hand, is classified among the “metahistorical studies” of the other half of the book, and is not 
even mentioned with respect to the genesis of the NHS.   
As a way of outlining an explanation for this strange situation, or pointing out a path for 
clarifying what Kuhn thinks about the genesis of the NHS, I call the reader’s attention to 
another article by Kuhn which is considered to be less important (in that Kuhn chose not to 
include it in the 1977 collection of writings).4  For our purposes, it is a strategic text, among 
other reasons, because it came after the others and allows some contact between Kuhn’s two 
approaches.  The text I refer to was published in 1970 as a review article in the journal 
Encounter, entitled: “Alexandre Koyré & the history of science – On an intellectual 
revolution”.5   
In all of Kuhn´s writings cited thus far, as well as others, he affirms the importance of 
Koyré for the NHS.  However the text I refer to, which is the only one specifically about 
Koyré (with the exception of two brief reviews in the 1950s, Kuhn 1957 and Kuhn 1958), 
contributes to a clearer and more critical understanding of the role of Koyré in the NHS, from 
Kuhn’s perspective, and from that, I believe, to a better understanding of Kuhn’s conception 
regarding the genesis of the NHS.   
I will thus organize the present paper as follows:  in section 2, below, I present the 
endogenous approach of Kuhn to the emergence of the NHS (referring to internal causes or 
reasons) and the predominantly exogenous approach, or that in which there is, in any case, no 
reference to the reasons alluded to previously.  In the third section, I present the 1970 article 
and distinguish the role of Koyré from that of Kuhn in the development of the NHS - in 
Kuhn’s point of view. I complement the work with a brief reflection regarding the 
justification of the new historiography.   
 
2.  The nature of the historiographic change 
2.1. An endogenous change 
In well-known passages of Section I of Structure, Kuhn briefly describes the traditional 
historiography of science in these terms: 
                                                 
4
 It should be taken into account, however, that the text was not disqualified by Kuhn, as he does refer to it in the 
1977 book (p. 150, note 15). Hanne Andersen also calls attention to this text in Andersen 2001. 
5
 Review article by Koyré 1968.  All six articles, among others, were published in French in Koyré 1973.  
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If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts, 
then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or 
another element to that particular constellation. (…)  And history of science becomes 
the discipline that chronicles both these successive increments and the obstacles that 
have inhibited their accumulation. Concerned with scientific development, the historian 
then appears to have two main tasks. On the one hand, he must determine by what man 
and at what point in time each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was 
discovered or invented. On the other, he must describe and explain the congeries of 
error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the 
constituents of the modern science text. Much research has been directed to these ends, 
and some still is (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 1-2). 
However, Kuhn emphasizes the need for a reaction to this practice, and suggests that 
some historians of science have already responded to it:  
In recent years, however, a few historians of science have been finding it more and more 
difficult to fulfill the functions that the concept of development-by-accumulation assigns 
to them. As chroniclers of an incremental process, they discover that additional research 
makes it harder, not easier, to answer questions like: When was oxygen discovered? 
Who first conceived of energy conservation? Increasingly, a few of them suspect that 
these are simply the wrong sorts of questions to ask. (…) The same historical research 
that displays the difficulties in isolating individual inventions and discoveries gives 
ground for profound doubts about the cumulative process through which these indi-
vidual contributions to science were thought to have been compounded (Kuhn 1970a, 
pp. 2-3). 
Thus, for Kuhn, the result of this reaction was “a historiographic revolution in the study 
of science”.  According to him: 
Gradually, and often without entirely realizing they are doing so, historians of 
science have begun to ask new sorts of questions and to trace different, and often 
less than cumulative, developmental lines for the sciences. Rather than seeking the 
permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to 
display the historical integrity of that science in its own time (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 3). 
This endogenous explanation is complemented by “The historical structure of scientific 
discovery” and Section VI of Structure, from which Kuhn said he extracted the main ideas for 
the former.  I give special attention to the article here because it was endorsed by Kuhn by 
republishing it in Essential tension.  In it, Kuhn establishes a distinction between two types of 
discoveries, seeking to point out more precisely how difficulties in traditional historiography, 
to which he refers in Section I of  Structure, emerge. 
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Kuhn saw no difficulty with the type of discovery, for example, of the neutrino, radio 
waves, or the missing elements in Mendeleiev’s periodic table.  According to him, the 
existence of these objects “had been predicted from theory before they were discovered, and 
the men who made the discoveries therefore knew from the start what to look for” (Kuhn 
1977, p. 167).   In such cases, therefore, the practice of the “old” traditional historiography 
would be perfectly admissible and feasible. 
Many scientific discoveries, however, “particularly the most interesting and 
important”, Kuhn stresses, are not of this type, and it would not be appropriate to ask when 
and where they occurred and who was responsible for them. Even if all the relevant 
information were available, he says, “those questions would not regularly possess answers”.  
More complex discoveries of this type include oxygen, the electric current, X-rays, and the 
electron, which according to Kuhn “could not be predicted from accepted theory in advance 
and which therefore caught the assembled profession by surprise” (Kuhn 1977, p. 166). And 
further on he adds: 
there is no single moment or day which the historian, however complete his data, can 
identify as the point at which the discovery was made. Often, when several individuals 
are involved, it is even impossible unequivocally to identify any one of them as the 
discoverer  (Kuhn 1977, p. 174, my emphasis). 
A passage in Structure allows us to compare the two types of discoveries considered by 
Kuhn directly.  He asks:  “Why could not X-rays have been accepted as just one more form of 
a well-known class of natural phenomena?  Why were they not, for example, received in the 
same way as the discovery of an additional chemical element?”  His answer: 
New elements to fill empty places in the periodic table were still being sought and found 
in Roentgen's day. Their pursuit was a standard project for normal science, and success 
was an occasion only for congratulations, not for surprise. 
X-rays, however, were greeted not only with surprise but with shock. Lord Kelvin at 
first pronounced them an elaborate hoax. Others, though they could not doubt the 
evidence, were clearly staggered by it. Though X-rays were not prohibited by 
established theory, they violated deeply entrenched expectations (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 58-
59). 
The discovery of a new element in the periodic table, for example, corresponded to a 
“standard project for normal science”.  Whereas for the second, more complex type, like the 
discovery of x-rays, despite being an accidental discovery, it could, in principle, induce a 
subversion of normal scientific practice, in the same way the discovery of a chemical element 
with unexpected characteristics could lead to an alteration in the periodic table.  As Kuhn 
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wrote: 
Previously completed work on normal projects would now have to be done again 
because earlier scientists had failed to recognize and control a relevant variable. X-rays, 
to be sure, opened up a new field and thus added to the potential domain of normal 
science. But they also, and this is now the more important point, changed fields that had 
already existed. In the process they denied previously paradigmatic types of 
instrumentation their right to that title (Kuhn 1970a, p. 59). 
And it is worth emphasizing, with Kuhn, to complete the comparison between the two 
types of discoveries, that 
discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which 
involves recognizing both that something is and what it is (...) But if both observation 
and conceptualization, fact and assimilation to theory, are inseparably linked in 
discovery, then discovery is a process and must take time. Only when all the relevant 
conceptual categories are prepared in advance, in which case the phenomenon would 
not be of a new sort, can discovering that and discovering what occur effortlessly, 
together, and in an instant (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 55-56).  
Thus, according to this first perspective of Kuhn regarding the historiographical change, 
traditional historiography of science was in no condition to respond to the difficulties 
presented by the second type of discovery in its context, or to be practiced according to the 
cumulativistic proposals that defined it.  It sought to respond to two distinct types of 
discoveries in the same way, as though there were only one type.  The change to the NHS 
would therefore signify necessarily overcoming these difficulties or anomalies which emerged 
in the effective practice of the ‘old historiography’. 
 
2.2  An exogenous change  
However, in the 1968 article “The history of science”, republished in 1977 in 
Essential tension, Kuhn offers another explanation for the genesis of the NHS; a 
predominantly exogenous explanation in which there is no reference to previous writings or 
to causes and reasons evoked by them.  He writes; 
Only in this century have historians of science gradually learned to see their subject 
matter as something different from a chronology of accumulating positive 
achievement in a technical specialty defined by hindsight. A number of factors 
contributed to this change (Kuhn 1977, p. 107).  
And Kuhn quickly lists four factors: 
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The first factor, which he highlights as “probably the most important”, was the 
influence of the history of philosophy which began at the end of the 19th Century.  The 
attitude of “hypothetical sympathy”, as he said, curiously referring to Russell (who is no 
model of historian of philosophy), or of methodological sympathy in relation to past 
thinkers, emerged in the history of science via philosophy.  It was learned from men such as 
Lange, Cassirer, Burtt, and Lovejoy, “who dealt historically with people or ideas that were 
also important for scientific development”, as well as “neo-Kantian epistemologists” like 
Brunschvicg and Meyerson.  Kuhn does not cite Koyré here, although he can certainly be 
included in this tradition, having been an historian of philosophy before becoming an historian of 
science (Cf. Kuhn 1977, p. 107-108.  Compare Kuhn 1970b, pp. 67-68, quoted below).   
This influence of the history of philosophy, according to Kuhn, was reinforced by 
“another decisive event in the emergence of the contemporary profession”:  the recognition, 
with the work of Pierre Duhem, of the importance of the Middle Ages for the history of 
science, albeit almost a century later in relation to what occurred in general history.  Despite 
the continuist positions that are often attributed to Duhem, as opposed to the discontinuist 
theory associated with the NHS, Kuhn believed Duhem had a positive influence in the advent 
of the historiographic revolution.  It was a lesson learned from Duhem, according o Kuhn, 
that the science of the 17th Century could only be understood “if medieval science were ex-
plored first on its own terms and then as the base from which the ‘new science’ sprang”.  And in 
this way, “more than any other”, emphasizes Kuhn, “that challenge has shaped the modern 
historiography of science”, and the work of historians like Koyré became models of the new 
historiographical practice (Cf. Kuhn 1977, p. 108). 
The third factor highlighted by Kuhn is “a repeated insistence that the student of 
scientific development concern himself with positive knowledge as a whole and that general 
histories of science replace histories of special sciences”.  According to him, the name of 
Auguste Comte was historically associated with this project, and recently and more 
effectively, the works of Tannery and Sarton.  It was not a successful experience, Kuhn says, 
but  “the attempt has been crucial, for it has highlighted the impossibility of attributing to the 
past the divisions of knowledge embodied in contemporary science curricula”, revealing 
ruptures (Kuhn 1977, p. 109).  
The fourth and final factor, which is more recent, is the so-called external history of 
science.  This refers to “an increased concern, deriving partly from general history and partly 
from German sociology and Marxist historiography, with the role of nonintellectual, 
particularly institutional and socioeconomic, factors in scientific development”.  According 
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to Kuhn, at the time he was writing, this influence had not yet become well-defined due to the 
resistance of followers and practitioners of the internal history, such as Koyré himself, who saw 
it as a threat to the objectivity of science.  However Kuhn had already called attention to the fact 
that joining internal history and external history could be the greatest challenge facing the 
profession.  And he noted, optimistically, that “there are increasing signs of a response” 
(Kuhn 1977, p. 109-110). 
As can be seen from this brief presentation of the influential factors in the genesis of the 
NHS, which Kuhn himself does not expand on much, the explanation he provides in his 1968 
text (and reiterates in 1977) is essentially an exogenous explanation.  In fact, of the four sets of 
factors, three are external or have origins which are external to the traditional practice of the 
history of science.  Only the third factor can be said to be endogenous, as Hoyningen-Huene 
appears to admit, without revealing, however, as we saw, the tension between the 
perspectives of Kuhn in Structure and Essential tension (Cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 
16).  
It is worth remembering, moreover, that even the endogenous factor is not 
explicitly present in the text of Structure. 6  On the other hand, there is no mention in the 
1968 text of the difficulties pointed out so emphatically by Kuhn in the previous 
approach, particularly with respect to the two types of discoveries.  Nevertheless, this 
distinction is important for the description of the practice of science (in its normal and 
extraordinary phases), as well as for the characterization of intertheoretical 
incommensurability.   
 
 
3. The new historiography of science:  Koyré and Kuhn 
Seeking to clarify these issues, I turn to the text in the journal Encounter.  Published in 
1970, “Alexandre Koyré & the History of Science: On an Intellectual Revolution” is a review 
of Metaphysics and Measurement – Essays in the Scientific Revolution, published by Koyré in 
1968.  Placing the text in context, Kuhn refers to what he considers to be an intellectual 
revolution that began in the 1940s – a revolution in the historiography of science still in 
progress in 1970. 
                                                 
6
 It is the theme of the article “Mathematical versus experimental traditions in the development of physical 
science”, published in 1976 and re-edited in Kuhn 1977. 
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Kuhn identifies two stages in this transformation.  The first, which he considered to be 
consolidated already at the time of his writing, was associated with those historians who saw 
the history of science as essentially the history of ideas (the so-called “internal history” 
mentioned above).  The second stage, still being developed at that point in time according to 
Kuhn, referred to those historians of science whose model was social and cultural history (the 
so-called “external history”).   
As a result, Kuhn writes, it is possible 
for the first time to see science as having a history, or at least one capable of interesting 
a contemporary historian. During the long years when scientific development was 
viewed as the routine result of applying "the scientific method," most history of science 
inevitably looked like mere chronology. Its concern – what else was there for
 
its 
practitioners to do? – was to
 
date and describe the emergence of the main components of 
objective method and to chronicle their triumph over superstition and error (Kuhn 
1970b, p. 67). 
However, more recent work in the history of science, said Kuhn, obeys a much more 
diverse model, in which the role of Alexandre Koyré stands out: 
Trained as a philosopher and historian of philosophy, Koyré’s transition to the history 
of science was marked by the publication in 1939 of his three brilliant Études 
galiléennes. Within a decade of their appearance, they and his subsequent work pro-
vided the models which historians of science increasingly aimed to emulate. More than 
any other single scholar, Koyré was responsible for the first stage of the 
historiographical revolution mentioned above. (…) Koyré showed how sympathetic and 
extended explications de textes could transform our image of the Scientific Revolution 
of the seventeenth century and of the men who made it (Kuhn 1970b, pp. 67-68).  
Thus, it was Koyré, among others, who brought to the historiography of science the 
approach which Kuhn, in the preface to Essential tension, referred to as hermeneutic; and 
which, according to him, was a habitual part of the process of educating historians in other 
fields, with the significant exception of historians of science. 7   
The importance of Koyré for the NHS is affirmed by Kuhn in many of his writings, 
generally in passing.  However, in the text we refer to in Encounter, unlike the others, there 
are also criticisms and reservations regarding Koyré, such as his disagreement with Koyré’s 
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 Having had access to Koyré shortly thereafter (Cf. Kuhn 2000, p. 285), Kuhn said that, “as a physicist”, he had 
to discover “the hermeneutic method” on his own.  This is the personal experience he tells about in the preface to 
Essential tension, and various other places, of a re-interpretation of the physics of Aristotle.   He felt the episode 
led to a decisive change in his view of science: “While discovering history, I had discovered my first scientific 
revolution” (Cf. Kuhn 1977, p. xiii). 
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statement that “good physics is made a priori” (p. 68).   Kuhn questions how Koyré could have 
failed to discuss the role played by the observation of pendulums in Galileo’s argument, 
commenting “That is no trivial slip, and it illustrates something else about Koyré. He did 
exaggerate the universality of his insights, and he did make mistakes, very occasionally 
egregious ones” (Kuhn 1970b, p. 69). 
But there are two more criticisms which I consider to be particularly relevant for my 
purposes here.  Kuhn said that most traditional historians of science, knowing beforehand 
what constitutes scientific knowledge, felt authorized to select the works of those whom they 
had studied and to pick out the passages which they believed contained lasting contributions 
to science.  “The discovery of such contributions was their ultimate goal” (Kuhn 1970b, p. 
68). 
And Kuhn compares: 
Koyré's aim was very similar, occasionally too much so. But for him the undertaking 
was far more problematic. To find out what, say, Galileo had contributed to the 
development of science, he had first to set Galileo in his own time, to discover what 
Galileo had taken science to be, what problems had seemed to him central, where his 
view of science and its problems had come from, and what alterations he had imposed 
upon that heritage. That task, Koyré felt, could not be done without immersion in an 
entire corpus, that of Galileo and those of his immediate predecessors, contemporaries, 
and successors (Kuhn 1970b, p. 68, my emphasis. Compare Kuhn 1970a, p. 3). 
It can be said, then, that for Kuhn, Koyré is not yet fully a new historian of science.  I 
think that, in the above passage, Kuhn affirms that Koyré has the same intentions and thus 
faces some of the same difficulties in practicing the ‘old historiography’ of science as the 
historians Kuhn refers to generically in Structure (in his strictly endogenous explanation).  
However, Koyré was able to begin to resolve these problems, perhaps due, essentially, to his 
background as a historian of philosophy (according to Kuhn’s exogenous explanation). 
With respect to the second criticism of Koyré’s historiographical practice, Kuhn writes: 
I began by crediting Alexandre Koyré with a dominant role in the first stage of an 
historiographical revolution. Reading these essays should give substance to that 
attribution, but it will also illustrate how little place he left for the second stage. Partly 
because of his philosophical concern with ideas and partly because he dealt with men 
whose work was comparatively little affected by the new socio-economic climate of 
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post-Renaissance Europe, he had little sympathy for those scholars who aimed to  
explain scientific development in social terms (Kuhn 1970b, p. 69).8 
However, Kuhn emphasizes, Koyré knew there were problems in this regard.  At the 
end of his life (he died in 1964), he spoke of how pleased he was with a book that seemed to 
“fill the hiatus between the history of science as such and social history”, which until then 
“were miles apart” from each other (Kuhn 1970b, p. 69). 
The book to which Koyré referred, Kuhn later recounted, was Structure itself.  Very 
modestly, Kuhn omits this from the text published in Encounter in 1970 9, but he reveals the 
fact informally in an interview in 1995, published in The Road since Structure: 
Another story out of sequence I don't want to forget: shortly before Alexandre Koyré 
died -- which is now a good many years later, he died shortly after Structure came out -
- I had a last letter from him. (…) He said, “I've been reading your book,” and I don't 
know what adjective he used, but it was a thoroughly agreeable one. He said, and again 
I had not seen this coming - when I thought about it, I thought he was right - he said, 
“you have brought the internal and external histories of science, which in the past have 
been very far apart, together.” Now, I hadn't thought of that at all as what I was doing. I 
saw what he meant, and coming from him it was particularly agreeable because he had 
been so anti-external history; his gifts were as an analyst of ideas. And that made an 
impression, or at least it pleased me tremendously (Kuhn 2000, p. 286).  
In this context, given the assessment of Koyré’s role, we can also understand Kuhn’s 
role in the NHS, from his own perspective.  In the first place, he deliberately avoids posing 
certain questions and seeking certain answers, as traditional historians did, including Koyré.  
As he writes in Structure: 
Was it Priestley or Lavoisier, if either, who first discovered oxygen? In any case, when 
was oxygen discovered? In that form the question could be asked even if only one 
claimant had existed. As a ruling about priority and date, an answer does not at all 
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 This does not mean that Koyré fails to attribute “a significant role in scientific development to extrascientific 
ideas”. What Kuhn emphasizes is that, like other internalists, Koyré resisted giving attention to socioeconomic 
and institutional factors, unlike authors like Robert Merton, for example.  This is what Kuhn said in a note, 
which was also important for an assessment he makes regarding the distinction between internal and external 
histories (Kuhn 1977, p. 32). 
9
 Perhaps it is not only a question of modesty, but also of initial surprise or disagreement with respect to Koyré’s 
observation.  After all, in a text from 1979, Kuhn still writes of the intrinsic impossibility of an integration 
between internal and external history.  In this text, he explicitly considers himself an internalist (Cf. Kuhn 1979, 
pp. 123 and 125).  And he makes the same affirmation retrospectively about Structure in The road since 
Structure: “I thought of it as pretty straight internalist. It constantly surprises people in England that I'm an 
internalist. They cannot get their heads around it” (Kuhn 2000, p. 287).  And perhaps an intermediary position 
can be seen in the 1968 text.  As we saw, he writes there optimistically that “there are increasing signs of a 
response” regarding integration, although he also points out that “any survey of the field’s present state 
must unfortunately still treat the two as virtually separate enterprises” (Kuhn 1977, pp. 109-110).   
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concern us. Nevertheless, an attempt to produce one will illuminate the nature of 
discovery, because there is no answer of the kind that is sought. Discovery is not the 
sort of process about which the question is appropriately asked (Kuhn 1970a, p. 54). 
In the second place, Kuhn admits, with Koyré, and finally acknowledges in the 1995 
interview mentioned above, that his theory comes to fill the void between internal and 
external histories.  It is not fitting here to specify what this fusion or this bridge would be, 
nor is it so important at this moment in time, when a clear distinction between the genesis 
and justification of knowledge is no longer prescribed.   
I limit myself to remembering that, in an interview published in Borradori 1994 (p. 
157), Kuhn goes so far as to say that he would perhaps classify Structure as a work in the 
sociology of knowledge, which certainly emphasizes the importance of studying scientific 
communities as producers and legitimaters of knowledge, with their psychological, 
sociological, and historical differences.  For him, scientific knowledge  “is intrinsically a 
group product” and  “neither its peculiar efficacy nor the manner in which it develops will be 
understood without reference to the special nature of the groups that produce it”.  In this 
sense, says Kuhn his work “has been deeply sociological, but not in a way that permits that 
subject to be separated from epistemology (Kuhn 1977, p. xx).   
By the way, Hoyningen-Huene said in a note that “Kuhn's theory can play a potentially 
important role in the integration of internal and external factors within historiography. For 
Kuhn's theory identifies a central point of contact between science and society: scientific 
values” (Hoyningen-Huene 2003, p. 19, note 70. See also pp. 147-154).  And Philip Kitcher 
may summerize most effectively what is in question when he states that, for Kuhn, 
“justification is always justification in a particular historical context” (Callebaut 1993, p. 45). 
 
4. Final considerations 
I would like to conclude with a word about the strange, somewhat schizophrenic 
manner in which Kuhn deals with the genesis of the NHS through two sets of writings which 
are not integrated and which do not appear to acknowledge one another.  My hypothesis is 
that the difficulty is related not to the genesis directly but to the justification of the NHS.  
With respect to the genesis, the two explanations can be suitably integrated.  As with 
the emergence of a new scientific theory, according to Kuhn, an internal anomaly would be 
the engine for change in the historiography of science, as well, complemented by external 
influences, such as, in this case, the historiography of philosophy.  But the apparently natural 
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transposition of Kuhn’s model of science to historiography of science seems to present a 
problem.  From the perspective of the justification, the two explanations appear to lead to 
very different results.   
The justification of the NHS associated with the strictly endogenous explanation is 
much stronger than that which follows from the predominantly exogenous explanation.  In 
the latter, the NHS would be merely an alternative to traditional historiography, and not the 
necessary way of practicing a truly historical historiography of science, as Kuhn would seem 
to demand.  It happens that the proposal has an undesirable result, and could have led Kuhn 
to decrease his emphasis on the idea of endogenous change, as presented in Structure:  in the 
case of science, the discarded theory is not a-scientific in itself, whereas in the case of the 
history of science, the traditional historiography of science, linear and cumulative, would be 
ahistorical . . .  
Kuhn is unequivocal with respect to this in Structure as well as in other texts.  In 
Structure, for example, he writes:  “even from history, however, that new concept will not 
be forthcoming if historical data continue to be sought and scrutinized mainly to answer 
questions posed by the unhistorical stereotype drawn from science texts” (Kuhn 1970a, 
p.1, my emphasis).  In fact, the ahistorical character extends beyond scientific textbooks.  It 
includes, according to Kuhn, the texts which are disseminated and philosophical works based 
on the textbooks (Cf. Kuhn 1970a, p.136). “All three of these categories” are responsible for 
the problem Kuhn calls “the invisibility of revolutions”, precisely because of their ahistorical 
approach.  He addresses this issue in a separate chapter, from which I quote the following 
excerpt, which summarizes well what is of interest to us here: 
Textbooks thus begin by truncating the scientist's sense of his discipline's history and 
then proceed to supply a substitute for what they have eliminated. Characteristically, 
textbooks of science contain just a bit of history, either in an introductory chapter or, 
more often, in scattered references to the great heroes of an earlier age. From such 
references both students and professionals come to feel like participants in a long-
standing historical tradition. Yet the textbook-derived tradition in which scientists come 
to sense their participation is one that, in fact, never existed. For reasons that are both 
obvious and highly functional, science textbooks (and too many of the older histories of 
science) refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that can easily be viewed as 
contributions to the statement and solution of the texts' paradigm problems. Partly by 
selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are implicitly 
represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance 
with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory 
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and method has made seem scientific. No wonder that textbooks and the historical 
tradition they imply have to be rewritten after each scientific revolution. And no 
wonder that, as they are rewritten, science once again comes to seem largely cumulative 
(Kuhn 1970a, pp. 137-138, my emphasis). 
One could add the word “ahistorical” to the end of this passage with no risk of 
rejection:  upon being re-written, science comes to seem largely cumulative and ahistorical, 
the legitimate product of an ahistorical historiography.  Elsewhere, Kuhn calls it Whig 
historiography (Cf. Butterfield 1931), as in this reference to Sarton in the 1995 interview: 
My notion was that there was a sort of history of science to do that Sarton wasn't 
doing. I mean, I would not have said then the sorts of things I would say now about 
him, and I recognize that in some very important sense he was a great man, but he 
certainly was a Whig historian (…) I could have learned a lot of data from Sarton but I 
wouldn't have learned any of the sorts of things I wanted to explore. (…) There were a 
number of other people who taught it within one or another of the science 
departments. But what they taught often was not quite history in my terms, at least, not 
quite history; it was textbook history. I have sometimes said that some of the greatest 
problems that I've had in my career are with scientists who think they are interested in 
history (Kuhn 2000, p. 282, my emphasis).10   
One should not lose sight of a fact that John Preston calls attention to:  that there are 
still those who defend the idea of a cumulative progress in the history of science, and mainly, 
that “[Kuhn’s] accusation that cumulativists don't take the history of science seriously fails to 
register the interpretive latitude available when doing history of science. Neither continuity 
nor revolution is written on the face of science, and to suppose otherwise is to fail to take 
account of the fact (of which Kuhn was elsewhere well aware) that history is an interpretive 
(and therefore partly philosophical) discipline” (Preston 2008, pp. 19 and 54). 
One of the “elsewhere’s” Preston refers to is certainly the Section I of Structure.  In the 
final pages, Kuhn writes about the genesis-justification distinction, understanding it as an 
                                                 
10
 Kuhn writes in Encounter, as we saw above, that with the emergence of the NHS , it is possible “for the first 
time to see science as having a history, or at least one capable of interesting a contemporary historian” (Kuhn 
1970b, p. 67, my emphasis).  He makes reference to the natural disinterest of the historian in an ahistorical 
discipline, as the history of science would have been prior to the NHS.  The idea that the ‘old historiography’ of 
science was ahistorical is also present in the writings of other authors.  See, for example, Kragh, who, echoing 
the Kuhnian critique, writes that Sarton’s view “was, at least by modern standards, somewhat naive and 
surprisingly ahistorical”.  He also cites Rupert Hall who asks, “with all respect” regarding Sarton, “if he was ever 
a historian at all”.  And also Butterfield, who speaks of Whig historiography as “unhistorical history writing” 
(Kragh 1987, pp. 18, 93 and 198, note 43). 
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integral part of a particular conception of science.  What he says there also gives substance to 
what we said earlier about his integration of internal and external histories (emphasized by 
Koyré): 
History, we too often say, is a purely descriptive discipline. The theses suggested 
above are, however, often interpretive and sometimes normative. Again, many of 
my generalizations are about the sociology or social psychology of scientists; yet 
at least a few of my conclusions belong traditionally to logic or epistemology. In 
the preceding paragraph I may even seem to have violated the very influential 
contemporary distinction between “the context of discovery” and “the context of 
justification” (…) Having been weaned intellectually on these distinctions and 
others like them, I could scarcely be more aware of their import and force. For 
many years I took them to be about the nature of knowledge (…) Yet my 
attempts to apply them, even grosso modo, to the actual situations in which 
knowledge is gained, accepted, and assimilated have made them seem 
extraordinarily problematic. Rather than being elementary logical or 
methodological distinctions, which would thus be prior to the analysis of 
scientific knowledge, they now seem integral parts of a traditional set of 
substantive answers to the very questions upon which they have been deployed. 
That circularity does not at all invalidate them. But it does make them parts of a 
theory and, by doing so, subjects them to the same scrutiny regularly applied to 
theories in other fields (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 8-9). 
Another pertinent passage is found in the text on the history of science published 
in 1979: 
What, then, has made fruitful interactions between history and philosophy of science so 
rare? Much of the answer is that they have, in fact, been infrequent only within the 
English-speaking or, more accurately, the logical-empiricist tradition. Most of the men, 
who provided internal historians with their primary models, were neo-Kantians of one 
sort or another. The philosophers who have recently found history of science relevant to 
philosophy are outside the logical empiricist tradition. What has seemed to separate 
history from philosophy of science is not, I think, intrinsic to either field but rather to a 
particular philosophical tradition, one largely confined in this century to the English-
speaking world. No equivalent separation has been visible on the Continent (Kuhn 
1979, p.125). 
It is curious to observe Kuhn’s difficulty in contrast with Koyré.  Koyré seems to 
consider traditional, or Whig, historiography as merely another possible historiography, which 
for Kuhn, at least in the case of science, signifies an ahistorical activity, which is not even 
possible to practice effectively.  Koyré writes: 
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The disdain to which the eighteenth century has been subjected can only be 
explained by the fact that it was vanquished. It is the victors that write history, and it 
is the representatives of this victory, representatives, in particular, of the Romantic 
reaction, and especially of the German Romantic reaction, who have largely 
determined our historical judgments and our very conception of history. They are 
also the men who have convinced us that the eighteenth century disregarded these 
ideas of ours.  
Nothing seems more untrue to me than this assertion. It seems to me indefensible, 
unless we accept the Romantic conception of history. If, on the contrary, we do not 
share this idea, we should find that it is to the eighteenth century that we owe the 
discovery, or rather the rediscovery, of history (…) Quite true, the men of the 
eighteenth century did not have the regard, the respect and the reverence for history that 
the Romantics had. Nor is there any doubt that they did not have the religion of 
scholarship, and that they often disregarded the details (and even more than the details) 
of the past. They felt no nostalgia for the past - like the Romantics. On the contrary, they 
were concerned primarily with the future (Koyré 1948, pp. 132-133). 
It is worth saying that these exemplarily tolerant words of Koyré come precisely from a 
text about Condorcet, an author who, for Kuhn, is one of the historic champions of the idea of 
cumulative progress . . . And I am reminded that Kuhn was once called a romantic  . . .   But 
that is another and longer story. 11 
 
References 
Andersen, H. “Critical Notice: Kuhn, Conant and Everything - A Full or Fuller Account”. 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, no. 2, 2001. 
Bloor, D. Knowledge and social imagery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 [1976]. 
Borradori, G. The American philosopher. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Butterfield, H. The Whig interpretation of history. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1973 [1931]. 
Callebaut, W. (org.) Taking the naturalistic turn: or How real philosophy of science is done. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
Hoyningen-Huene, P. Reconstructing scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993. 
 17 
Koyré, A. “Condorcet”. Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 9, no. 2, 1948. 
__________Metaphysics and Measurement – Essays in the Scientific Revolution. London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1968. 
__________ Études d'histoire de la pensée scientifique. Paris: Gallimard, 1973. 
Kragh, H. An introduction to the historiography of science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987. 
Kuhn, T.  Review of A. Koyré: A  Documentary History of the Problem of Fall from Kepler to 
Newton. Isis 48: 91-93, 1957.  
_________ Review of A. Koyré: From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Science 
127: 64, 1958. 
_________ “History of science” [1968]. In Kuhn, 1977. 
_________ “The historical structure of scientific discovery” [1962]. In Kuhn, 1977. 
_________ The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd. 
ed., 1970 [1962].  
_________ Alexandre Koyré & the History of Science – On an Intellectual Revolution. 
Encounter, 34,1970. 
_________ The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.  
_________ “History of science”. In Kyburg, H. et al. (eds) : Current Research in Philosophy 
of Science. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979. 
_________ The Road since Structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.  
Preston, J. Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions: a reader’s guide. London: 
Continuum, 2008. 
Richardson, A. et al. (eds.). Logical empiricism in North America. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2003.   
                                                                                                                                                        
11
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